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Clarifying the Attempt to Monopolize Offense as an
Alternative to Protectionist Legislation: The
Conditional Relevance of "Dangerous
Probability of Success"
James F. Ponsoldt*
The wounded condition of several major American industries,
including steel and textiles, resulting from foreign "predatory"
conduct has generated much commentary.' At the same time, pri-
vate spokesmen for our institutionalized business interests, includ-
ing the financial community, have bemoaned American balance of
trade figures, blaming them on such "impediments" to our export
trade as foreign trade barriers and domestic antitrust laws.2 The
two trade problems suggest a common theme: foreign govern-
ments have been unfairly aiding their business interests by protect-
ing monopolized or cartelized foreign markets from American
business penetration while also subsidizing, directly or indirectly,
foreign invasion of certain targeted American markets.3
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; A.B., 1968, Cornell
University; J.D., 1972, Harvard University. The author gratefully acknowledges the re-
search assistance of Mary Pat Flaherty, a 1986 graduate of the University of Virginia Law
School.
1 See, e.g., Senate O.K.s Bill That Curbs Textile Imports, AtlantaJ., Nov. 14, 1985, at 1E. In
that article, Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, is
quoted as follows: "Unless something is done to stop these massive imports coming in
here, you won't have a textile industry. What I'm talking about is jobs. Jobs for Ameri-
cans." Id. Senator Daniel Evans, an opponent of the legislation, is quoted as responding,
"If the prices [of domestic goods] were lower here, we wouldn't have any imports." Id.
President Reagan subsequently vetoed the legislation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1985, at Al.
2 See, e.g., editorial by Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge, calling for the re-
peal of section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1985, at 28, col. 3.
3 See Mitsui & Co. v. Western Concrete Structures Co., 760 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 230 (1985), where the Ninth Circuit held that importers ofJapanese steel
strand at below government import price control levels and in violation of the Antidumping
Acts may have violated the Sherman Act, even where the product was sold at prices above
cost. Id. at 1016.
What has happened, in general, is that the relevant geographic market for competition
among most manufactured products has expanded beyond national borders. American big
business and its labor union constituency, suffering from the effects of mergers and market
concentration, were simply unprepared for the change from relatively benign competitive
conditions, engendered in part by lax antitrust enforcement. Business and labor have
sought relief in the nature of industry wide cooperation and government protection from
the demands of a world-wide free market system. This article suggests an alternative to the
proposed protectionist legislation which would insulate our markets from competition and
unduly involve the federal government in private commercial conduct. The alternative in-
volves heightened sensitivity toward the Sherman Antitrust Act and use of the Act by do-
mestic manufacturers, as "private attorneys general," as a legitimate defensive weapon
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While recognizing subsidized imports and the resulting foreign
trade imbalances as trade policy problems, scholars, judges, and
governmental officials4 have also expressed interest in resolving a
related domestic competition issue which could help to eliminate
predatory conduct in international as well as domestic trade.
Through a modest judicial or, if necessary, legislative route, these
people seek a clarification of the attempt offense in section 2 of the
Sherman Act 5 to bring the law defining attempt to monopolize in
line with the common law and Model Penal Code definitions of
criminal attempt.6 Many circuit courts currently require a showing
that the defendant is dangerously close to monopolization before
finding an attempt to monopolize. 7 A clarification of the attempt
offense would emphasize that victimized American corporations
may bring private attempt to monopolize cases against state con-
trolled or subsidized foreign manufacturers that have penetrated
American markets through predatory means while their domestic
markets remain monopolized. These suits should be allowed even
against foreign predation, as occurred in Mitsui & Co., supra, and in In re Japanese Elec.
Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
4 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 144 (1979); L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 137-38 (1977); Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A
Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 375, 380
(1974); Ponsoldt, Antitrust: Alternative to Protectionism, Legal Times, Oct. 17, 1983, at 8, 10.
The clarification is opposed by Halverson, Kalinowski, Lifland & Rosch, Joint Statement on
Simplification of Standards for Attempted Monopolization, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 813, 816 (1979). See
also Jakobs & Hove, Remedies for Unfair Import Competition in the United States, 13 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 1, 27 (1980).
5 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The statute provides, in relevant part: "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... "
6 See notes 8, 153-54 infra and accompanying text. See generally Wechsler, Jones &
Kom, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: At-
tempt, Solicitation and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 571 (1961).
7 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 76, 92-93. In Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu
Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981), however, the
court reversed the dismissal of a complaint which did not allege that the defendant's con-
duct posed a dangerous probability of establishing a monopoly over the prepared spaghetti
sauce market. The court stated:
It is apparent that each situation will present different problems that mandate a
flexible approach toward the "mix" of conduct, actor, and market conditions that
make up the offense. In some cases of clearly exclusionary conduct, the conduct
itself, along with the exclusionary intent that can be inferred from it, poses such a
danger to competition that it may be condemned regardless of the market power
of the actor . . . . Such clearly exclusionary behavior, even though it poses no
immediate measurable danger to the market, presents the potential for mischief.
To the extent that such conduct inevitably harms competition, there is little reason
to tolerate it.
627 F.2d at 925.
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where, as a practical matter, the foreign competitors are not "dan-
gerously close" to monopolizing American markets.8
This article, in Part I, will review the background and existing
state of the law of attempt to monopolize in the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts, with particular attention given to the prevail-
ing requirement that the plaintiff show that the defendant is dan-
gerously close to successful monopolization. Part II will focus upon
the two major attempt to monopolize cases brought in the last dec-
ade by the Department of Justice.9 The practices challenged in
those cases constitute domestic counterparts of some of the alleged
predatory practices of foreign competitors, and the cases make
clear that the Department has, as a matter of domestic antitrust en-
forcement, been strongly supportive of the clarification of the at-
tempt offense advocated herein. 10 Part III will review the common
law of criminal attempt, which the Supreme Court seems to have
recognized as applicable to the Sherman Act,1' and suggest that it is
parallel to the proposal contained in the 1979 National Commis-
sion Report to the President concerning the attempt to monopolize
provision. That proposal does not require independent proof that
a defendant is likely to achieve monopoly power.' 2
The article will conclude that a clarification' 3 of the attempt to
8 See Mitsui Co. v. Western Concrete Structures, Inc., 706 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 230 (1985); In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir.), rev'd sub nom., Matsushita Elec. Ind. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). Of
course, allegations of predatory conduct and intent would have to be backed up with proof.
As a general matter, the Model Penal Code law of criminal attempt requires proof that a
defendant committed an overt act with the specific intent of achieving the ultimate criminal
result, constituting a substantial step toward that result. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(C)
(official draft 1962). Intervening events which interfered with the actor's goal, rendering
his success unlikely or even impossible, provide no defense. Thus, evidence that a foreign
corporation with substantial market power or a monopoly in its domestic market has either
engaged in or subsidized below cost pricing in U.S. markets, withheld needed supplies,
attempted to control prices, or blocked channels of distribution with the intent to eliminate
competitors, should, without more, be probative of an attempt to monopolize under gener-
ally recognized criminal law standards.
9 United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd,
743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 420 (1985); United States v. Empire
Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
10 Perhaps the clearest expression of the position of the United States with respect to
the attempt to monopolize provision is the Memorandum to the Solicitor General submit-
ted by the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division in the Empire Gas case in
1976. The Memorandum recommended that a petition for certiorari be filed in that case.
The resulting petition for certiorari was filed on November 23, 1976. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 1, United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd,
537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). The author of this article
represented the United States in the Empire Gas case as a Justice Department attorney.
I I See notes 34-40 infra and accompanying text.
12 See note 153 infra and accompanying text.
13 In Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 504 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978), the court spelled out the basis for the clarification as follows:
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monopolize provision, which would not require independent proof
that a defendant is dangerously close to successful monopolization,
will resolve an issue of glaring ambiguity in our domestic competi-
tion law. The clarification could provide a legitimate weapon for
our domestic industries to use against truly predatory foreign com-
petition, while not directly involving United States foreign trade
policy and avoiding traditional forms of economic retaliation dam-
aging to world markets.
I. Judicial Interpretations of Attempt to Monopolize
A. Background: The Scope and Elements of the Offense
In recent years, few areas of antitrust law have produced wider
disagreement among courts and commentators than the proscrip-
tion against attempts to monopolize contained in section 2 of the
Sherman Act. 14 Fueling this controversy is the consistent and ap-
parently calculated refusal of the United States Supreme Court to
grant certiorari and clearly delineate the required elements of the
attempt offense.' 5 Consequently, the lower federal courts' treat-
ment of attempt to monopolize claims continues to reflect the con-
fusion that exists in the area.
The courts disagree about both the general scope and specific
A prima facie case of attempt to monopolize is made out by evidence of a specific
intent to monopolize "any part" of commerce, plus anticompetitive conduct di-
rected to the accomplishment of that unlawful purpose . . . . If proof of an eco-
nomic market, technically defined, and proof of a dangerous probability of
monopolization of such a market were made essential elements of an attempt to
monopolize, as a practical matter the attempt offense would cease to have in-
dependent significance. A single firm that did not control something close to 50
percent of the entire market, . . . would be free to indulge in any activity however
unreasonable, predatory, destructive of competition and without legitimate busi-
ness justification. Any concern not dangerously close to monopoly power could
deliberately destroy its competitors with impunity. These are not abstract hypoth-
eses. A market share approaching monopoly is not required to enable one con-
cern seriously to impede the capacity of others to compete by use of abusive trade
practices. A construction of the Sherman Act that would immunize such practices
would be contrary to the purposes of the Act; it is not required by the Act's lan-
guage or legislative history.
14 See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964). Cf. United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 245 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). See also
Blecher, Attempt to Monopolize Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: "Dangerous Probability" of
Monopolization Within the "Relevant Market," 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215 (1969); Cooper,
supra note 4; Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1956);
Note, Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sherman Act: Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a
Prima Fade Case, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1451 (1973); Note, The Role of Attempt to Monopolize in
Antitrust Regulation: An Economic and SocialJustiflcation for a New Approach, 31 VAND. L. REV.
309 (1978).
15 See, e.g., Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 823 (1977). Pacific Eng'g & Prods. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
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elements of the attempt offense. The prevailing definition of at-
tempt to monopolize gives the offense meaning only as an appen-
dage to the completed offense of monopolization. 16 When so
analyzed, the only business practices which can constitute an at-
tempt to monopolize are those creating a "dangerous probability"
that the actor will achieve monopoly power. 17 This conceptualiza-
tion of the scope of the offense is consistent with the criminal law
attempt doctrine, which provides that a defendant may be punished
only when his intent and conduct combine to create a danger that
the statutorily identified harm to society will occur.18 An attempt is
defined, therefore, in terms of the completed offense. Thus lim-
ited, section 2's prohibition on attempts to monopolize, considered
together with the inability of section 1 to reach conduct which does
not involve concerted action, has often left the Sherman Act incapa-
ble of regulating single firm, anticompetitive behavior where the
firm possesses neither monopoly power nor market power close to
monopoly power.
An alternative approach to attempt to monopolize posits that
the attempt offense should be distinguished in scope from monopo-
lization-that the concept of monopoly be "attenuated" in attempt
cases. 19 The premise of this argument is that anticompetitive con-
duct which otherwise would fall into the gap between sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act should not go unchallenged. Thus, although
the Act is overtly a criminal statute, its nature is similar to that of a
constitutional provision-something to be flexibly construed, con-
sidering the needs and the times, in light of the congressional man-
date to preserve competition and prevent the abuse of economic
power.20 Congress extended an invitation to the federal judiciary
to develop a federal common law of antitrust based upon these pol-
icy objectives. Any contemporary judicial evaluation of the Sher-
man Act should be guided accordingly.
This article does not propose a judicial "attenuation" of the
monopoly concept in deciding attempt to monopolize cases,
whether involving domestic or international predation. Confining
the scope of the attempt offense to cases in which a defendant's
overtly predatory conduct indicates an intention to "monopolize,"
as that term is defined by the courts, 2' is necessary to prevent over-
16 Cooper, supra note 4, at 379; Note, supra note 14, 31 VAND. L. REV. at 334.
17 See, e.g., Panotex Pipe Line Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 457 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972); Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970).
18 See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-r, CRIMINAL LAW 438 (1972).
19 "I think the attenuation of the monopoly concept in attempt and conspiracy cases
can easily be justified .... Turner, supra note 14, at 305.
20 Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
21 The offense of monopolization has been defined to consist of the willful acquisition
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involvement of the government in the free market and overreach-
ing treble-damages litigation by inefficient private competitors.
The attempt offense should remain tied to the monopoly con-
cept, but ambiguity concerning the specific elements of an attempt
to monopolize offense must be clarified. The lower federal courts
are divided on the issue, 22 and the Supreme Court has not explicitly
addressed the question. A consensus exists that, in an attempted
monopolization case, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's spe-
cific intent to monopolize a part of interstate or foreign commerce,
plus an overt act constituting an unfair method of competition, 23
which "tends" or is a "substantial step" toward the acquisition of
monopoly power. This consensus derives from the Supreme
Court's decision in Swift & Co. v. United States, 24 in which Justice
Holmes first outlined the elements of the attempt to monopolize
offense:
Intent is . . . essential to such an attempt [to monopolize].
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result
which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-
but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature
to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is neces-
sary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will hap-
pen. . . . But when that intent and the consequent dangerous
probability exists, this statute [the Sherman Act], like many
others, and like the common law in some cases, directs itself
against that dangerous probability as well as against the com-
pleted result.2 5
The ambiguity surrounds the question of whether the danger-
ous probability of successful monopolization is an element which
the plaintiff must prove independently, or whether it is a necessary
consequence of the intent, so that only intent plus the overt act
must be proved. Closely related is the question of whether, in or-
der to demonstrate a specific intent to monopolize, the plaintiff
must allege and prove the relevant market which the defendant is
attempting to dominate and the defendant's power within that mar-
or maintenance of the power to control price or exclude competition in a relevant market
when it is desired to do so. United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
22 See, e.g., Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prod. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.) (requiring
proof of specific intent and proof of market power as two separate elements), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1022 (1973); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.) (requiring only
proof of specific intent), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); American Football League v. Na-
tional Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962) (requiring proof of specific intent to
monopolize a defined market, but not a demonstration of market power), aff'd, 323 F.2d
134 (4th Cir. 1963).
23 See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 94 (1953); Lorainjour-
nal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
24 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
25 Id. at 396.
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ket. The Ninth Circuit has explicitly disavowed the latter require-
ment in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co. 26 and subsequent decisions27 but,
as will be discussed below, the majority of circuit courts have
adopted the requirement in varying forms.
Currently, the courts or commentators have given some sup-
port to four alternative positions regarding the elements of at-
tempted monopolization. The first approach requires only that the
plaintiff show the defendant's specific intent to monopolize, which
can be inferred from evidence of a blatantly and unambiguously
predatory act. The plaintiff need not independently prove either a
relevant market or a dangerous probability of successful monopoli-
zation as objective elements. This approach assumes, in effect, that
a defendant would not engage in unambiguously predatory conduct
unless he believed he would obtain some monopolistic advantage.
The defendant's belief would constitute sufficient evidence of his
intention and the danger to competition.28
The second approach requires that the plaintiff show, through
independent but not necessarily exclusive evidence, that the de-
fendant specifically intended to acquire monopoly power and en-
gaged in overt conduct constituting a substantial step toward the
acquisition of such power. In order to prove an intention to mo-
nopolize, the plaintiff must identify and prove the objectively rele-
vant market in question. However, the fact that a defendant could
not realistically have achieved a monopoly due to intervening cir-
cumstances is irrelevant; there is no requirement that the plaintiff
prove a dangerous probability of success. Evidence demonstrating
the anticompetitive consequences as the defendant perceived them,
suggesting a monopolistic intent, would suffice.2 9
A third approach requires that the plaintiff prove the defend-
ant's specific intent to monopolize an objectively defined market, an
overt act tending toward monopoly, and the probability that mo-
nopoly would be achieved if the defendant's predatory practices
were allowed to continue or were successfully consummated. Thus
defined, a "dangerous probability" of successful monopolization is
a separate element of the attempt offense, but evidence of such
dangerous probability often overlaps with evidence of the preda-
tory practices and the market structure. Under such a test, a de-
fendant's theoretical capacity to monopolize can be dispositive of
the "dangerous probability," and evidence of intervening events
26 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
27 See, e.g., Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1983), Industrial Bldg.
Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970).
28 See 327 F.2d at 474-75; Turner, supra note 14, at 305.
29 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 13. See also LorainJournal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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which preclude the achievement of a monopoly provides no
defense.30
Finally, utilizing a fourth approach, a number of courts have
further refined the "dangerous probability of success" requirement
in the third approach above. They hold that the plaintiff must show
that the defendant engaged in practices which, if successfully con-
summated, would achieve a monopoly, and also, that the defendant
was, as a practical matter, on the brink of success. 3 1 Under this last
approach, legal or factual impossibility would bar successful prose-
cution. Moreover, the application of Chicago School economic the-
ory,32 suggesting that defacto entry barriers are fictional, would also
preclude a finding of an actual probability of monopolization.33
Judicial or legislative acceptance of any of the first three ap-
proaches, but particularly the second, would allow the practical ap-
plication of the attempt offense in the context of foreign predation.
The premise of this article is that the second approach, which is
most closely aligned with the general criminal law of attempt,
would allow American businesses confronted with truly predatory
activity by foreign competitors to defend themselves through pri-
vate Sherman Act litigation.
B. The Supreme Court Precedents
The Supreme Court could adopt the second-or criminal
law-approach described above in attempt to monopolize cases
without overruling any of its own precedents. The Court has never
held that "dangerous probability of success" is an element of an
attempt to monopolize case.
In Swift & Co. v. United States,3 4 the Supreme Court held that a
scheme whereby a dominant proportion of meat dealers agreed,
among other things, to fix prices and restrict shipments of meat was
illegal under the Sherman Act and could be enjoined.35 In discuss-
30 See Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 598 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972); United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d
1114, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1984), revg 570 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Tex. 1983), cert. dismissed, 106 S.
Ct. 420 (1985).
31 See Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prod. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1022 (1973); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975),
aft'd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
32 See, e.g., Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981).
33 Such was the principal holding of the court of appeals in United States v. Empire Gas
Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), affk 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
34 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
35 Id. at 394, 398.
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ing the meat dealers' arrangement for lower railroad shipping
rates, Justice Holmes said:
Not every act that may be done with intent to produce an unlaw-
ful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt. It is a question
of proximity and degree. The distinction between mere prepa-
ration and attempt is well known in the criminal law. Common-
wealth v. Peaslee, 177 Massachusetts 267, 272. The same
distinction is recognized in cases like the present.3 6
Swift is the only Supreme Court decision which can accurately be
described as containing a holding regarding the nature of the act
requirement in an attempt to monopolize case.
The reference to Peaslee suggests that Justice Holmes thought
that proof of some kind of proximity to a completed monopoly was
necessary. In a dissenting opinion in a land fraud case which he
wrote a few years later, he did say that an "attempt" requires a
"dangerous proximity to success."3 7 The Swift opinion, however,
need not be interpreted as requiring some kind of showing of prox-
imity to monopoly. The preparation-attempt discussion appears in
the context of an analysis of the sufficiency of a charge that the de-
fendants had attempted to monopolize by obtaining rebates from
railroads. The opinion concludes that the rebate allegations of the
complaint were sufficient without stopping to analyze the effects of
the practice. The opinion does not say that the complaint alleged
that the practice had produced any effects. Justice Holmes simply
said: "We are of opinion, however, that such a combination is
within the meaning of the statute. It is obvious that no more pow-
erful instrument of monopoly could be used than an advantage in
the cost of transportation."38
Justice Holmes' observation and the Court's holding mean that
an intent to monopolize coupled with the use of a powerful instru-
ment of monopoly in furtherance of that intent is sufficient to estab-
lish an attempt to monopolize. Such a test is essentially equivalent
to the Model Penal Code "substantial step" test.39 Thus, predatory
international trade practices, such as engaging in subsidized, be-
low-cost pricing while monopolizing a domestic market, or commu-
nicating threats of price retaliation to competitors for the purpose
36 Id. at 402. Peaslee was an attempted arson case. The evidence indicated that the
defendant had no immediate intention of lighting the candle when he assembled the com-
bustible materials in his shop. Peaslee subsequently decided to return to the shop to light
the candle and arranged for his assistant to drive him to the shop from a hotel in another
town. Peaslee changed his mind and turned back when they were about a quarter of a mile
from the shop. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Peaslee never
came close enough to completing the criminal act to warrant an attempt prosecution.
37 Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384, 388 (1912).
38 196 U.S. at 402.
39 See note 155 infra and accompanying text.
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of inducing them to adhere to particular prices or to forego certain
customers, should be more than sufficient to satisfy the Swift test.
The threats and below-cost pricing constitute substantial steps in
furtherance of the scheme, and the use of such threats by a multi-
market, deep pocket company against small, single-market firms is a
powerful instrument of monopoly.40
The Swift and Peaslee opinions do not, in any event, use the
phrase "dangerous probability of success" to describe the type of
proof which is required in an attempt case. 41 A careful reading of
the passage where that phrase appears reveals not only that Justice
Holmes did not say that the plaintiff must prove a specific intent
plus a dangerous probability of success, but also that he said the
defendants could be liable even though they had not yet performed
acts which would be sufficient to produce a monopoly.42 The refer-
ence to the "intent and the consequent dangerous probability" 43
means that the intent rather than the past acts creates the danger
that monopoly will result. The Court assumed that a would-be mo-
nopolist who has the requisite intent is likely to perform further
acts which will result in monopoly.
The notion that a "dangerous probability of success" is a sepa-
rate element of the attempt to monopolize offense apparently did
not arise until long after the Swift decision.44 In particular, no opin-
ion of any court prior to the mid-1940s even suggested that such a
requirement existed. The error of including "dangerous prob-
ability of success" as a separate element probably originated with
the district judge's jury instruction in the second American Tobacco
case,45 which the Supreme Court quoted in its opinion in American
Tobacco Co. v. United States.46 The district judge assumed that a de-
40 Cf Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41 Justice Holmes did, of course, use the phrase "dangerous proximity to success" in
Hyde. 225 U.S. at 388. Proximity is not synonymous with probability. In any event, Justice
Holmes was not speaking for the Court. The Court has never held that a "dangerous prox-
imity" is essential in an attempt to monopolize case or any other kind of attempt case.
42 See 196 U.S. at 396. See also Justice Holmes' description of the Swift case in Hyde.
225 U.S. at 387.
43 196 U.S. at 396.
44 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), in
which Judge Learned Hand restated the Swift description of the attempt to monopolize
offense as follows:
Although the primary evil was monopoly, the Act also covered preliminary steps,
which, if continued, would lead to it. These may do no harm of themselves; but, if
they are initial moves in a plan or scheme which, carried out, will result in monop-
oly, they are dangerous and the law will nip them in the bud.
Id. at 431.
45 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944).
46 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946). That instruction stated, "The phrase 'attempt to monopo-
lize' means the employment of methods, means and practices which would, if successful,
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fendant must approach dangerously close to achieving a monopoly
before he could be convicted of an attempt to monopolize.
The Supreme Court quoted the jury instructions with respect
to monopoly, attempt, and conspiracy in full.47 The opinion does
not, however, contain any discussion of the attempt instructions as
such because the Court had no reason to discuss attempt require-
ments. The jury had returned guilty verdicts on the actual monop-
oly and attempt to monopolize charges, and the district judge had
declined to impose sentence on the attempt count because it had
merged with the monopoly count.48
In discussing the attempt to monopolize charges in subsequent
cases, the Supreme Court has neither mentioned the American To-
bacco instruction nor attempted to analyze the probability of success
as a separate element. The decisions are based upon an analysis of
the evidence of intent and suggest that neither proof of the defend-
ant's market power nor evidence of a dangerous probability of mo-
nopolization are elements of the attempt offense.
In United States v. Columbia Steel Co. ,49 the government chal-
lenged United States Steel's acquisition of a competing West Coast
steel fabricator as a violation of Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 as an
attempt to monopolize the market in fabricated steel products. In
affirming the dismissal of the government's suit, the Court ex-
plained that "even though the restraint effected may be reasonable
under [section] 1, it may constitute an attempt to monopolize for-
bidden by [section] 2 if a specific intent to monopolize may be shown." 50
The Court made no mention of any requirement of proof of the
defendant's market power or of a dangerous probability of monop-
olization. The decision indicates, however, that the Court was
aware of the defendant's relative market strength.
The Supreme Court dealt with an attempt to monopolize case
again in LorainJournal v. United States.51 The Court affirmed a judg-
ment that the defendant had attempted to monopolize. The district
court opinion did not contain any finding that the defendant's con-
duct had created a probability of monopoly. The Supreme Court
did not specifically address that question or whether the plaintiff, a
newspaper, competed within the same objectively defined market as
its target, a radio station. The district court had said: "Where that
is the purpose and design with which the defendants act, it is legally
accomplish monopolization and which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so close
as to create a dangerous probability of it ....
47 328 U.S. at 784-86.
48 Id. at 783.
49 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
50 Id. at 531-32 (emphasis added).
51 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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immaterial whether the course of action is or might be success-
ful."52 The Supreme Court did not indicate that the district judge
had applied the wrong test.53
Subsequently, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,54
the Court seemed to reiterate the position it appeared to have taken
in Columbia Steel: that proof of a specific intent to monopolize suf-
fices to prove an attempt to monopolize. In holding that the de-
fendant had not violated section 2 by requiring advertisers to buy
space in both its morning and evening papers, the Court an-
nounced that a violation of the attempt prohibition required "a spe-
cific intent to destroy competition or build a monopoly . . . .55
Once again, the Court failed to explicitly state whether proof of the
defendant's market power or of a dangerous probability of monop-
olization was required for an attempt to monopolize. 56
Thus, a majority of the circuits have adopted the premise that
attempt to monopolize requires a showing of intent plus a danger-
ous probability of success, although the Supreme Court has not de-
cided that this is the case. The lower courts may find an implied
endorsement of the "dangerous probability" requirement injustice
Clark's opinion in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery
Corp. 57 Although the opinion does not use that term, Justice Clark
did say:
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a
part of trade or commerce under § 2 of the Sherman Act, it
would then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of
the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the
product involved. Without a definition of that market there is
no way to measure Food Machinery's ability to lessen or destroy
52 92 F. Supp. 794, 798 (N.D. Ohio 1950), aft'd, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
53 Nevertheless, a defendant in Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957), which was decided after Columbia Steel and Lorain
Journal, contended in his appeal to the Eighth Circuit that his attempt to monopolize con-
viction should be reversed because the district court failed to give the instruction which the
Supreme Court had "approved" in American Tobacco. The Eighth Circuit rejected his con-
tention because the instruction was substantially the same as the "approved" instruction.
Id. at 663. The net effect of the Kansas City Star decision was to implant the idea that some
showing of "dangerous probability of success" is essential in an attempt to monopolize
case. All of the subsequent Eighth Circuit decisions have taken that premise as a given.
54 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
55 Id. at 626.
56 See also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949), involving an appeal
from a dismissal of a charge of conspiracy to monopolize rather than of attempt to monopo-
lize. Some courts have cited it as authority for the view that the plaintiff does not have to
prove either a relevant market or a dangerous probability of success in an attempt case.
The Yellow Cab Court ruled that a defined market and defendant's share thereof were irrele-
vant to a conspiracy to monopolize charge and that a conspiracy may be proved so long as
an appreciable amount of commerce is affected. The § 2 language "any part of the trade or
commerce," it is argued, is equally applicable to attempt to monopolize.
57 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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competition. It may be that the device-knee-action swing dif-
fusers-used in sewage treatment systems does not comprise a
relevant market. There may be effective substitutes for the de-
vice which do not infringe the patent .... 58
The trial court had dismissed a counterclaim alleging that the
plaintiff had monopolized by obtaining a patent through fraud.
The trial court held that the Sherman Act did not cover such con-
duct. The Supreme Court held that obtaining a patent by fraud
may violate section 2 if the other elements are present. In Justice
Clark's opinion, the counterclaim did not adequately allege the
other elements, since it did not allege that the patent would give
the plaintiff a monopoly of a market nor did it demonstrate that the
patented article was a distinct product market when the case was
tried.59
The Walker opinion focuses primarily upon the proof of rele-
vant market question rather than the nature of the act requirement.
A court could hold that markets must be identified as part of the
intent showing because intent to monopolize necessarily means an
intent to achieve monopoly in some market. However, the courts
which have insisted upon proof of well-defined markets in attempt
to monopolize cases have generally insisted upon proof that the de-
fendant's efforts produced a dangerous probability of success. 60
58 Id. at 177-78.
59 The Walker opinion was issued after the Ninth Circuit opinion in Lessig v. Tidewater
Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), which held that a plaintiff
is not required to demonstrate a dangerous probability of success and that the relevant
market is "not in issue" in an attempt to monopolize case. TheJustice Department's Hiland
Memorandum (Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968)) was filed
about three years after the Walker decision. After endorsing the Lessig statement that rele-
vant market is "not in issue" in an attempt to monopolize case, the Hiland Memorandum
said:
We recognize that this Court expressed a seemingly contrary view of the "at-
tempt to monopolize" provision in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-178. We do not believe the issue is foreclosed by that
decision, however, since only monopolization, and not attempt to monopolize, was
alleged in the complaint in that case, and neither in the brief nor in oral argument
was there any effort to deal with the proper construction of the "attempt to mo-
nopolize" provision.
Hiland Memorandum at 11-12.
The effort to distinguish Walker is not entirely convincing. The discussion of the need
to define a market and "to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim"
within that market is more than pure dictum. The district court had dismissed the counter-
claim for failure to state a claim and the Supreme Court was attempting to determine
whether that action should be affirmed. Of course, the statement that it would also be
necessary to define the market if the complainant proceeded on an attempt to monopolize
theory may technically be dictum inasmuch as the counterclaim apparently alleged that the
patent holder had obtained a monopoly. However, an alternative attempt to monopolize
claim would probably be implicit in such a complaint. In any event, Justice Clark did say
that the complainant would have to identify a market if it proceeded on an attempt to mo-
nopolize theory in that case and a majority of the Court did join in the opinion.
60 See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547,
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The assumption that market definition is to be required if, but only
if, some appraisal of actual or potential competitive effects is neces-
sary, is logical and parallels the dual approach in section 1 cases.
Justice Clark did, in any event, associate market definition with
some kind of appraisal of actual or potential competitive effects.
He found it necessary "to appraise" the exclusionary power of the
patent, and there is no way to measure "ability to lessen or destroy
competition" without defining a market. He did not say that the
appraisal must demonstrate a "dangerous probability" of monopo-
lization or that it must demonstrate that the patent has already pro-
duced some impact upon the market. But he obviously thought the
claimant must demonstrate that the patent could have some kind of
adverse effect upon the level of competition in some market in or-
der to establish an attempt to monopolize. 6'
Considered together, the Supreme Court opinions discussing
attempt to monopolize are inconclusive on the issue of "dangerous
probability of success." The Court has never discussed the concep-
tual relationship between monopolization and attempt. Neither has
the Court examined the role of the attempt offense in the frame-
work of contemporary antitrust policy. Accordingly, the Court
could now hold that an appraisal of the actual and likely effects of a
defendant's attempt to monopolize conduct is unnecessary, while at
the same time distinguishing Walker. Walker does not modify the
Swift rule that attempt to monopolize is established if a defendant
utilizes a potential instrument of monopoly with the requisite spe-
cific intent to monopolize. Thus, the applicable Supreme Court
precedents do not foreclose the Court from adopting the approach
suggested by this article-the traditional criminal law rule.
C. Attempt to Monopolize in the Lower Courts
Relying upon the Supreme Court's dicta in Swift & Co. v. United
States and American Tobacco Co. v. United States, the majority of lower
federal courts62 construe the attempt to monopolize prohibition of
550 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods.
Co., 479 F.2d 269, 284 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973); Acme Precision Prods.,
Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 479 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1973).
61 382 U.S. at 177-78. The paragraph which follows the discussion of the need to iden-
tify a relevant market and appraise the effect of the patent provided:
As respondent points out, Walker has not clearly articulated its claim. It ap-
pears to be based on a concept of per se illegality under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
But in these circumstances, the issue is premature. As the Court summarized in
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the area of per se illegality is
carefully limited. We are reluctant to extend it on the bare pleadings and absent
examination of market effect and economic consequences.
Id. at 178.
62 See, e.g., notes 64, 76, and 82 infra and accompanying text.
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section 2 of the Sherman Act to impose a two-part burden of proof
on the plaintiff.63 The plaintiff must first prove that the defendant
had a specific intent to monopolize. 64 This intent is generally in-
ferred from a showing that the defendant engaged in illegal or
predatory conduct.
The plaintiff must next demonstrate as an independent ele-
ment that the defendant's activities created a dangerous probability
of it obtaining monopoly power in the relevant market.65 This re-
quirement reflects the belief that the attempt prohibition is merely
an appendage of the monopolization offense. Thus, the plaintiff in
an attempt case faces the same procedural and substantive burdens
he would face in a monopolization case. 66 The plaintiff must first
identify the relevant product and geographic markets and then
prove the defendant's share of the combined relevant market.
Once this market share is determined, the plaintiff must then
demonstrate, and the factfinder must find, that it is "dangerously
probable" that the defendant will achieve a monopoly position in
the relevant market as a result of its anticompetitive conduct. A
majority of the circuit courts, therefore, utilize approaches three or
four, as described above, with respect to the elements of attempt to
monopolize. The opinions, however, do not sufficiently distinguish
between those two alternatives.
The Eighth Circuit has not followed a consistent pattern in de-
fining the content of the "dangerous probability" requirement.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Kansas City Star Co. v. United States67
effectively required that the plaintiff make a showing of some "dan-
gerous probability" in attempt cases. This decision was based on
the belief that the jury instruction in the case was the same as the
jury instruction in American Tobacco .68 However, the jury instruction
in Kansas City Star 69 differed substantially from the American Tobacco
instruction. The American Tobacco instruction required that the de-
fendant do something which would produce monopoly if it suc-
ceeded and which approached success close enough to produce a
63 See note 60 supra.
64 See, e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 910 (1977); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964); Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968),
aff'd per curium, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969).
65 See Cooper, supra note 4, at 384-88; Note, supra note 14, 73 COLUM. L. REV. at 1459-
64; Note, supra note 14, 31 VAND. L. REv. at 335-37. See, e.g., Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons
Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269, 284 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973); Hiland Dairy,
Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
66 See Cooper, supra note 4, at 384-88.
67 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
68 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
69 See note 53 supra.
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dangerous probability of monopoly.70 The Kansas City Star instruc-
tion required only that the defendant do something "which, if suc-
cessful, would be likely to accomplish such monopolization." 7'
The Kansas City Star instruction did not require that the plaintiff
prove that the acts were likely to succeed or that unsuccessful acts
had produced a dangerous probability, or even a substantial possi-
bility, of monopoly. Several subsequent Eighth Circuit opinions
described the dangerous probability requirement in terms compa-
rable to the Kansas City Star instruction. In 1968 that court said that
"[a]n attempt to monopolize is established when there is a 'danger-
ous probability' of monopolization if the attempt is successful." 72
A shift apparently occurred with the issuance of the opinion in
Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Products Co. in 1973.73 Judge Ross, writing
for the court, quoted the American Tobacco instruction in full and
declared: "Thus in this case we must determine whether Hammons
presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could properly
conclude that Agrashell approached 'so close [to monopolization]
as to create a dangerous probability of it. . ... . 74 It is evident from
Judge Ross' later opinion in Empire Gas 75 that the Agrashell standard,
unlike Kansas City Star, required proof of actual proximity to mo-
nopolization. The Eighth Circuit thus requires that the plaintiff in
an attempt case show that the defendant is dangerously close to
monopolization. 7 6
The Ninth Circuit has also followed a somewhat wavering path
with regard to the attempt to monopolize offense. In Lessig v. Tide-
70 See note 46 supra.
71 240 F.2d at 663.
72 TV Signal Co. of Aberdeen v. A.T.&T. Co., 462 F.2d 1256, 1261 (8th Cir. 1968)
(emphasis added).
73 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973).
74 479 F.2d at 285 (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785
(1946)).
75 United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'g 393 F. Supp.
903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). See notes 101-12 infra and accom-
panying text. The court in Empire Gas analyzed evidence with respect to the effects of the
defendant's actions in order to determine whether certain local markets were on the brink
of monopolization and concluded that the evidence was too inconclusive, even though the
court found that the defendant specifically intended to monopolize.
76 More recent Eighth Circuit attempt to monopolize cases include: National Report-
ing Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1985) (On appeal by U.S. Tax
Court Reporting Service from a finding of liability for monopolization and attempted mo-
nopolization, the court reversed the finding of attempted monopolization and held that
there was no dangerous probability of success because the defendant was not in a position
to raise prices in light of the bidding process involved in court-reporting contracts and
because of the presence of competition in the market); Trace X Chemical, Inc. v. Canadian
Indus., 738 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1984) (the court rejected the lower court's finding of an-
ticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Act by a manufacturer of TNT, finding instead
that defendant's behavior constituted valid business conduct).
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water Oil Co., 7 7 the court stated, "We reject the premise that
probability of actual monopolization is an essential element of
proof of attempt to monopolize." 78 The opinion acknowledged
that the likelihood of monopolization may be relevant circumstan-
tial evidence of intent, but concluded that it is logical to assume
"that the actor is better able than others to judge the practical pos-
sibility of achieving his illegal objective." 79 Later Ninth Circuit
cases, however, appeared to retreat from the Lessig rule.80 The
Ninth Circuit finally reexamined all of its prior decisions in Hall-
mark Industry v. Reynolds Metals Co. ,81 and reaffirmed the Lessig rule.8 2
77 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964).
78 Id. at 474.
79 Id.
80 See Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir. 1977); Cornwell Quality
Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972).
81 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
82 Id. at 12-13. More recent Ninth Circuit attempt to monopolize cases include the
following: Blanton v. Mobile Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1983) (the court followed
the modified interpretation of the Lessig doctrine enunciated in Grough), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1874 (1985); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978) (the court held,
modifying the Lessig doctrine, that where plaintiff did not prove a relevant market or market
power, it must prove either predatory conduct or a per se violation of the Sherman Act
under § 1), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979).
In his dissent from denial of certiorari in Blanton, Justice White criticized the modified
Lessig doctrine, stating that Lessig "allows a violation of § 2 ... without regard to the effect
of a defendant's conduct in any relevant market." 105 S. Ct. at 1875 (White,J, dissenting).
Other Ninth Circuit cases have required the traditional elements of the offense: West-
ern Concrete Structures Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 760 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1985) (Plaintiff
brought an antitrust suit against a competitor based on allegations that defendant had con-
spired and attempted to monopolize. In upholding the district court's finding that plaintiff
had stated a claim for attempted monopolization, the court stated that conduct which is
competitive under § 1 may be anticompetitive under § 2 if its purpose is to monopolize. In
this case, plaintiff's allegations of defendant's violation of import restrictions so it could
underbid competitors stated a claim for attempted monopolization when combined with an
allegation of 70% market share of the defendant.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 230 (1985); Fore-
most Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983) (The court affirmed
the lower court finding that, among other things, plaintiff had failed to state a claim for
monopolization or attempted monopolization. Addressing attempted monopolization, the
court stated that, while both specific intent and dangerous probability can be inferred from
anticompetitive or predatory conduct, plaintiff had not alleged such conduct. Rather, de-
fendant's conduct was permissible, innovative, and competitive behavior.), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1038 (1984); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. IT Continental Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) (The court analyzed attempted monopolization claim as follows:
(1) specific intent may be inferred from conduct which may be the basis for a claim of
restraint of trade, but evidence of intent alone, without evidence of conduct, cannot sustain
a claim of attempted monopolization; (2) dangerous probability may also be inferred from
the existence of overt acts and specific intent or from evidence of conduct alone, but it is
always relevant in an attempt case; (3) proof of conduct is important to both of the other
elements, and the type of conduct which must be proven depends on how extensively or
sufficiently the plaintiff has been able to prove the other elements. In general, however, the
required conduct is such that it only makes sense in that it eliminates competition, i.e., it is not
legitimate competition.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
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Thus, the Ninth Circuit does not require a "dangerous probability
of success" in an attempted monopolization case.
The Seventh Circuit has adopted an intermediate position.
Although it has accepted the proposition that a plaintiff must make
some kind of "dangerous probability" showing, that court has ef-
fectively equated "dangerous probability" with proof that the de-
fendant has the capacity to monopolize. The Seventh Circuit had
endorsed the idea that a "dangerous probability" requirement ex-
ists even before the Eighth Circuit decision in Kansas City Star. That
court affirmed the dismissal of an antitrust complaint in Mackey v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. 83 The court noted several deficiencies in the
complaint and added: "Furthermore, the complaint does not allege
a dangerous probability that defendant may achieve a monopoly." 84
The Mackey opinion did not elaborate on the nature of the "danger-
ous probability" allegation which would be required. In 1969 the
court stated that a monopolist must have both the intent and power
to monopolize and there was no "evidentiary basis for holding that
the defendant possessed the power to monopolize." 85
The emphasis upon "power to monopolize" seems to equate
"dangerous probability" with a showing that the defendant has the
capacity to monopolize, rather than a showing that the past acts of
the defendant have already created a dangerous probability of mo-
nopolization. The opinion in Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings &
Lewis, Inc. 86 appears to confirm that this is the case. While noting
that the defendant on the counterclaim had an approximate one-
third market share, the court went on to discuss the significance of
that fact and the elements of the offense as follows:
Plaintiff's actual position in the industry is not, however, the
sole test of violation of § 2. By condemning attempts to monop-
olize, that section directs itself against dangerous probabilities
as well as the completed result.
A reliable or accurate measure of the actual likelihood that
plaintiff would have achieved monopoly status... is, of course,
not possible. However, we do not understand the "dangerous
probability" test to involve an evaluation of the actual likelihood
that an attempt would have succeeded if not frustrated by an
appraisal of the alleged offender's ability to achieve the forbid-
den result, his intent, and the nature of his overt actions. In an
antitrust context we must consider the firm's capacity to commit
the offense, the scope of its objective, and the character of its
83 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 865 (1957).
84 Id. at 873.
85 Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 912 (1970).
86 452 F.2d 579, 597-99 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
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conduct. The ultimate concern is the firm's actual or threatened
impact on competition in the relevant market.8 7
The court went on to hold that all three elements of the offense
were satisfied on the facts of the case: (1) the "impressive size" of
the defendant on the counterclaim, its strong patent position, and
its "highly profitable" arrangements gave it "the capacity to make a
serious attempt to acquire monopoly status" in the narrowly de-
fined relevant market to which the parties had stipulated; (2) de-
fendant's undeniable intent "to acquire the power to exclude
competition from [a] portion of the market" was given substance by
the fact that "[fjulfillment of its objectives would have significantly
enhanced its market position"; and (3) defendant's conduct in the
prosecution of its patent application was "appropriately character-
ized as 'predatory.' "88
The Seventh Circuit approach is arguably closer to the Ninth
Circuit rule than it is to the Eighth Circuit rule. The only difference
appears to be that the Seventh Circuit would always require some
evaluation of capacity, while the Ninth Circuit would assume that a
defendant who engages in blatantly anticompetitive conduct is the
best judge of his own capacity.89
The law is somewhat less clear in the remaining circuits. The
Third Circuit rule appears to be essentially the same as the Seventh
Circuit. That court has held that an "essential element of the of-
fense is that the actor have sufficient market power to come danger-
ously close to success." 90 This sounds like a capacity requirement
87 Id. at 598 (footnotes omitted).
88 Id. at 598-99.
89 For more recent cases, see Lectro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982), in which plaintiff appealed from a lower court deci-
sion that certain noncompetition contracts between the parties did not violate the antitrust
laws. With respect to the charge of attempted monopolization, the court found that: (1)
Because of defendant's declining market share, there was no dangerous probability of suc-
cess. The court acknowledged that attempted monopolization does not require that the
attempt ripen into monopoly, and that a subsequent failure to achieve monopoly cannot
vitiate a claim of attempted monopoly where other evidence supports an attempt. The court
stated, however, that subsequent market performance can be considered as evidence of
existence of the alleged attempt; (2) The noncompetition contracts and defendant's acquisi-
tion of other vending companies did not constitute anticompetitive conduct because they
were motivated by legitimate business purposes, not by monopolistic intent; and (3) The
defendant did not have the specific intent to monopolize because the evidence showed that
its actions were taken for valid business reasons. Thus, no inference of specific intent could
be made from the defendant's action.
See also Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 917 (1980) (affirming a holding for plaintiff that defendant's conduct constituted an
attempt to monopolize the "drive-thru retail photo processing submarket in Indianapolis").
90 Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1348 (3d Cir. 1975). See also
Sunshine Books v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1981), vacated, 697 F.2d 90 (3d
Cir. 1982), in which plaintiff sued the University bookstore for attempted monopolization
of the sale of undergraduate textbooks by means of predatory pricing. The court stated
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rather than a showing that the past acts of a defendant have already
created a great danger of monopoly.
The First Circuit may be in accord with the Eighth Circuit ap-
proach. In George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc. ,91 it
endorsed the Agrashell rule that proof of relevant product and geo-
graphic markets is a necessary predicate for success in any attempt
to monopolize case. In explaining the rationale for that rule, the
First Circuit stated: "To be successful, an attempt case must estab-
lish both an intent to monopolize and a dangerous probability of
successful monopolization . . . . [T]hese elements take on mean-
ing only with reference to an actual or potential exercise of power,
which in turn must be assessed in the context of a relevant
market." 92
The Fifth Circuit also appears to be in line with the Eighth Cir-
cuit. It has held: "In order to maintain a charge of attempt to mo-
nopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is necessary to
show, inter alia, that there is a dangerous probability that the at-
tempt will be successful." 93
The Fourth Circuit apparently endorsed the proposition that
some kind of "dangerous probability" is a separate element of the
attempt offense in McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co. 94 It held
that a complaint was deficient because it was "bereft" of several
essential allegations including "an intent to monopolize coupled
with a dangerous possibility that a monopoly could be effectuated
.... 995 The opinion does not elaborate on the nature of the "dan-
that anticompetitive conduct is a necessary element of an attempted monopolization claim,
since both intent and dangerous probability of success can be inferred from such conduct.
The court concluded, however, that the University did not engage in predatory pricing or
anticompetitive conduct of any other kind, and thus granted summary judgment for
defendant.
91 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
92 Id. at 550. Plaintiff, a manufacturer of swimming pool equipment, charged defend-
ant with attempted monopolization of the public swimming pool market by persuading en-
gineers and architects to use its proprietary specifications in constructing the pools. As to
intent, the court stated that defendant's intent, at most, was to eliminate plaintiff as a com-
petitor. Similarly, while intent may be inferred from conduct, defendant's conduct was di-
rected only at plaintiff. Since defendant possessed only a 2.7% share of the market, which
would rise to 3% if plaintiff were eliminated, the court found no dangerous probability of
sucessful monopolization. See also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Medical Elec. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1382
(D. Mass. 1982). In Bard, a manufacturer of medical equipment brought suit to recover for
the cost of goods sold to defendant distributor. Distributor defended by charging plaintiff
with, among other things, attempted monopolization. The court held that defendant failed
to allege facts showing relevant market or plaintiff's market power.
93 Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 417 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1969). See also
United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d
1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 420 (1985).
94 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959).
95 Id. at 339. See also Harris v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 469 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.N.C. 1978)
(Distributor of petroleum products sued oil company for, among other things, violations of
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gerous possibility" requirement. However, the use of the word
"possibility" in lieu of "probability" indicates something akin to a
capacity requirement. Thus, the Fourth Circuit may be more in line
with the Third and Seventh Circuits than it is with the First, Fifth,
and Eighth Circuits.
The Tenth Circuit has also endorsed the view that some show-
ing of dangerous probability is essential to the attempt offense. It
has held that a district court should not have submitted an attempt
to monopolize question to the jury because the plaintiff did not
present facts "as to the market being considered, and the defend-
ant's power in it."96
II. The Justice Department's Interpretation of
Attempt to Monopolize
The Department of Justice has consistently interpreted the at-
tempt provision in section 2 of the Sherman Act as incorporating
the common law of criminal attempt.9 7 Generally, criminal law defi-
nitions of any attempt offense have never required independent
proof that, literally, a dangerous probability exists that the defend-
the Sherman Act. In rejecting plaintiff's attempted monopolization claim, the court stated
that defendant's 3% market share could not give rise to a dangerous probability of monop-
olization as a matter of law.).
96 EJ. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 907 (1976). In Delaney, plaintiff brought suit against a cosmetic manufacturer alleging
antitrust violations. Addressing the attempt to monopolize clause, the court stated that
both specific intent and dangerous probability of success were required to prove attempt,
and that proof of dangerous probability required proof of relevant market and market
power. 525 F.2d at 305. The plaintiff failed to allege relevant market or market power, and
therefore, the jury could not properly measure the parties' position in the relevant market;
any damages awarded were thus the result of speculation. Id. at 306-07.
See also the recent attempt to monopolize decisions by the Second and Sixth Circuits,
which appear to be consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent: White & White, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983) (Appeal by distributor of hospital
supplies from ajudgment in favor of the plaintiffs to an antitrust action. After establishing
the elements of the attempt to monopolize offense as "1. Specific intent to monopolize; 2.
Anticompetitive conduct; [and] 3. A dangerous probability of success," the court stated that
while specific intent could be inferred from evidence of anticompetitive conduct, in this
case the conduct in question was not an unreasonable restraint of trade, and therefore two
of the three elements were absent. Id. at 506-07. In discussing dangerous probability of
success, the court stated that a finding of that element required a finding that defendant
possessed market strength approaching monopoly power. The court rejected the district
court's finding that a market share of 25% presented a dangerous probability of success.
The court reversed the lower court's finding of attempted monopolization.); Nifty Foods
Corp. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1980) (Plaintiff, a former supplier
of frozen waffles to a grocery chain, sued the chain and its successor, Pet, Inc., alleging,
among other things, violation of the antitrust laws. The court did not discuss specific in-
tent, since it found that because defendant's market share declined significantly in the rele-
vant time period (from 54.5% to 33% in five years), there was no probability that defendant
could monopolize the relevant market. The court found no dangerous probabilty of suc-
cess, as a matter of law, since monopolization was a legal impossibility.).
97 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 11-12.
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ant will achieve his goal, other than the danger naturally resulting
from intention and conduct amounting to a substantial step. 98
Thus, the government has taken the position that it should not have
to prove, through independent evidence, that an attempt to mo-
nopolize defendant is dangerously close to achieving monopoly
power.99 Rather, the government has contended that once it
proves that a defendant has engaged in unambiguously monopolis-
tic conduct, without economic justification, the defendant's specific
intent to monopolize can be inferred from such conduct, and the
factfinder may conclude that the plaintiff has satisfied its burden of
proof.100
A premise of this article is that since the Sherman Act is facially
a criminal statute with criminal sanctions, the appropriate model
for judicial clarification of the attempt offense should be interpreta-
tions adopted in government enforcement proceedings. If section
2 is to be consistently applied, interpretations of the statute thereaf-
ter should not vary in private treble-damages actions, particularly
those challenging predatory conduct in import trade.
A. The Empire Gas Case
In United States v. Empire Gas Corp. ,101 the government brought
an antitrust action against Empire Gas, a retailer and wholesaler of
liquid petroleum (LP) gas,10 2 alleging in part that Empire Gas had
attempted to monopolize the retail sale of LP gas in the Lebanon,
Wheaton, and other local Missouri markets. On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit agreed with the government that the evidence regarding the
defendant's activities was sufficient to demonstrate that it had spe-
98 See generally Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 6.
99 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 8-9, 12-14.
100 Id. at 13.
101 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aft'd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
102 Empire, a Missouri corporation, was incorporated in 1963 and was headquartered in
Lebanon, Missouri. Through and in conjunction with its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Em-
pire was engaged in purchasing, transporting, and selling LP gas and selling and leasing LP
gas equipment.
LP gas is produced by crude oil refineries and natural gas plants. It is compressed into
a liquid state and is regularly and continuously shipped and sold in interstate commerce to
LP gas distributors located throughout the United States. Because of the high transporta-
tion costs associated with the distribution of LP gas, the effective marketing area of a LP gas
distributor is confined to an area within a short distance of his bulk storage plant. Distribu-
tors usually limit their sales to customers located within a radius of 20 to 30 miles of each of
their plants. Empire began operations with a few bulk plants in Missouri and experienced
rapid growth. Ten years later, its operations had expanded to 24 other states. Empire's
gross revenues increased from $1.2 million in 1964 to $44.8 million in 1973, and its pre-tax
income increased from $212,042 to $7.5 million during the same period. Its total assets
grew from about $3.6 million in June 1965 to about $48.3 million in June 1972. Most of
Empire's growth was attributable to acquisitions. During the first 10 years of its existence,
it acquired 81 LP gas retailers with close to 400 bulk plants.
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cific intent to control prices and therefore to monopolize relevant
markets. The court also agreed that the defendant's conduct was
sufficiently predatory to constitute a specific intent to monopolize.
However, despite local market shares of approximately fifty per-
cent, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the evi-
dence was insufficient to demonstrate a dangerous probability that
Empire Gas would be able to continue to exert control over prices
or exclude its competitors in any geographic market.10 3
The Justice Department filed a civil complaint against Empire
in 1972 alleging that Empire's activities, including the destruction
of competitors' property, constituted an attempt to monopolize in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.10 4 Criminal charges
under the Sherman Act were dismissed in April 1973. The govern-
ment then filed an amended complaint in June 1973, which alleged
that Empire had attempted to monopolize the retail sale of LP gas
in "various local marketing areas within the State of Missouri and
other states in which the defendant operates . *..."105 The
amended complaint also added allegations that Empire had vio-
lated section 1 of the Sherman Act by price fixing, market alloca-
tion, reciprocal dealing, obtaining covenants not to compete which
unreasonably restrained trade, and resorting to vexatious
litigation.106
103 537 F.2d at 307.
104 In early 1969, two men were apprehended in Southern Missouri with a dynamite
bomb. After being convicted for possession of an illegal and unregistered bomb, one of
those individuals advised federal authorities that Empire had hired him to destroy a com-
petitor's truck. Three grand jury investigations of Empire's business activities followed.
The third grand jury returned a four count indictment on August 14, 1972, in the Western
District of Missouri, which charged Empire with aiding and abetting in the possession of an
illegally made and unregistered firearm and attempting to monopolize the retail distribu-
tion of LP gas. Much of the foregoing description of the background of the case is taken
from the 1976 Memorandum to the Solicitor General, supra note 10, at 3.
The antitrust charges were not based solely on the bomb incident. The grand jury had
received testimony from a large number of competitors, former competitors, and former
employees indicating that Empire had resorted to a variety of means in pressuring other LP
gas dealers to sell their businesses, raise their prices, or restrict their operations. Empire
had also obtained covenants not to compete from sellers of businesses and all of its employ-
ees which were extremely broad in scope. Empire also filed, or threatened to file, a number
of lawsuits against former employees.
105 Memorandum to the Solicitor General, supra note 10, at 7.
106 Defense counsel agreed to supply the government with Empire's own estimate of
some of its marketing areas and the market shares of Empire and its competitors. The
reasons for doing so are somewhat unclear, but defendant apparently hoped that the rela-
tively low market shares would demonstrate that it would be impossible to prove a "danger-
ous probability" that Empire would achieve a monopoly in any of the local markets.
Defendant supplied a total of 23 maps which represented the areas served by particular
Empire subsidiaries together with a list of companies who sold LP gas in each area and
Empire's best guess with respect to the market share of each.
Government trial counsel decided to use 7 of those 23 areas as geographic markets,
but combined or modified others to produce 6 additional geographic markets. The ques-
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Empire had various responses to price competition and the
loss of some of its customers. An Empire officer or employee
would contact competitors and inform them that Empire wanted a
specific retail price in a particular area and did not want to lose any
customers. When such advice was ignored, the threat was made
more specific: either the competitor would raise its price to that
charged by Empire and would stop soliciting Empire's customers or
Empire would reduce its price well below that charged by the com-
petitor and would solicit all the competitor's customers. Some
competitors who refused to comply were asked if they wished to sell
their business to Empire and were told that they could not possibly
compete against Empire; at least one did sell after such a warning
and solicitation. On at least one occasion, Empire purchased the
supplier of its retail competitor and "put the squeeze" on that com-
petitor. On several occasions, Empire carried through with its eco-
nomic threats and drastically and selectively reduced its retail prices
to solicit customers of recalcitrant competitors. 107
tionnaires were mailed to the LP gas dealers listed by Empire and to all other companies
which might have been selling LP gas in any of those 13 markets, asking them to supply
1972 sales data for the area described in an accompanying map. The government then
prepared market share tables for each of the 13 markets based on the survey data. Those
tables showed that Empire had 50.43% of the Lebanon market and its nearest competitor
had 13.09%. Empire had 47.08% of the Wheaton market and the nearest competitor had
13.01%. It ranked first with 30-40% in the four markets, first with less than 20% in four
markets, second with 27.09% in one market, and third with less than 20% in the remaining
market.
107 The Arthur Gas Company incident is somewhat typical. Robert Plaster, Empire's
President, telephoned William Arthur of Arthur Gas, a competitor in the Lebanon and Ni-
angua areas, and asked Mr. Arthur to raise his price. Arthur responded: "I could take care
of my business and he could take care of his." Plaster said he was going to put Arthur out
of business. Empire then sent a truck labeled "Arthur Gas Company" to solicit Arthur
customers at a very low price. The driver told customers that they had bought out Arthur
Gas Company.
On another occasion, Plaster told a competitor who declined to raise his price that he
was going to play "burnout" with him. A short time later Empire rented space in a town
served by that competitor which Empire had not previously served. Empire attempted to
hire some of the competitor's employees and offered gas to his customers at substantially
reduced prices.
The documentary evidence included all of the acquisition agreements and related cov-
enants not to compete, 3239 covenants not to compete signed by Empire employees, maps
showing the government's 13 geographic markets, the market share tables, and price and
profit studies by a government economist.
The market performance evidence included a study of pricing patterns in the Lebanon,
Wheaton, Niangua, and Springfield markets. Those graphs indicated that Lebanon and
Wheaton prices were considerably higher than Niangua and Springfield prices. Lebanon
prices tended upward and Wheaton prices tended to be extremely stable with price fluctua-
tions within a narrow band. Niangua and Springfield prices showed greater fluctuations.
The government economist testified that the Lebanon and Wheaton pricing patterns
were precisely what an economist would expect to find in a market in which monopoly
power was present. In a highly competitive market, the prices tend to be low and to fluctu-
ate with supply and demand. He also said that he selected those four markets for study
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The district court found that Empire did not enter into any
agreement to fix prices108 or allocate markets,10 9 that the covenants
not to compete were not shown to be unreasonable restraints of
trade, o10 and that the litigation to enforce the covenants was not
vexatious.' The district court also concluded that Empire did not
attempt to monopolize. It held that the plaintiff in an attempt to
monopolize case must establish (1) that relevant product and geo-
graphic markets existed, (2) that the defendant had a specific intent
to achieve a monopoly, and (3) that the defendant had a dangerous
probability of success in achieving a monopoly. 1 2 The district
court concluded that the retail distribution of LP gas was not a rele-
vant product market, and that none of the thirteen areas shown on
the government's maps were relevant geographic markets."13 Even
if the court accepted the government's markets, the government
could not prevail because it failed to demonstrate that Empire
"possessed a specific intent to achieve monopoly" or "at any time
had a dangerous probability of success in achieving a monopoly
"114
The government contended on appeal to the Eighth Circuit
that the district court's specific intent and dangerous probability
conclusions were based on the unstated premise that a defendant
must have a large market share to have a monopoly. According to
the government, if the court had realized that a company can
achieve monopoly power, i.e., the power to control prices by coerc-
ing competitors to adhere to its prices, it would have found that
Empire intended to achieve that result whenever and wherever pos-
sible and had come close to succeeding in some of its markets.
The court of appeals accepted the government's theory of mo-
nopoly. It held that the district court's finding that Empire did not
threaten competitors was "clearly erroneous" because it disre-
garded the uncontradicted testimony of a number of government
witnesses." 5 The opinion recited in some depth the evidence of
Empire's attempt to control prices by threatening competitors with
because Empire had a 50% share in Lebanon and 47% in Wheaton, while it had only 19%
in Springfield and 16% in Niangua.
108 393 F. Supp. at 913.
109 Id. at 910.
110 Id. at 913.
III Id. at 914.
112 Id. at 909.
113 The district court would not accept the government's geographic markets because
the government did not present evidence "to establish this methodology and underlying
data used in drawing these lines" and the court "does not know how, why, and by whom the
lines were drawn." Id. at 906.
114 Id.
115 United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 301 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'g 393 F.
Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
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predatory pricing, and held that such evidence demonstrated a spe-
cific intention to monopolize. 11 6 The court of appeals concluded:
"[A]n attempt to control price, competition or both demonstrates
specific intent to monopolize. We find the government has proved
both and has thus met the burden of showing that intent here."' 117
The court of appeals also concluded that the district court
committed clear error in rejecting LP gas as a relevant product mar-
ket.118 The court accepted the government's Lebanon and Whea-
ton geographic markets for purposes of the case, but concluded
that the district court's refusal to accept the sufficiency of the "dan-
gerous probability of success" evidence was not "clearly
erroneous."
1 9
In particular, the court concluded that the evidence of market
impact did not demonstrate a dangerous probability of monopoli-
zation in the Lebanon and Wheaton markets. The fifty and fourty-
seven percent market shares for the particular submarkets, accord-
ing to the court, were "not alone sufficient to demonstrate a
dangerous probability of success,"' 20 and the record did not
demonstrate that Empire's coercive practices had any effect upon
the actions of any actual or potential competitor in those areas.
The court of appeals held that "the district court was not clearly
erroneous when it found that the government failed to prove dan-
gerous probability of success in its attempt to control competition
or its attempt to raise prices by price intimidation."' 2 1
The Solicitor General's petition for a writ of certiorari argued
that Eighth Circuit decisions holding that a "dangerous probability
of success" was an essential element of an attempt to monopolize
offense were erroneous, and that the common law of criminal at-
tempt had never contained such a requirement. 22 It also argued
that the rigorous requirements which the court imposed in the case
with respect to proof of proximity to successful monopolization
were inconsistent with some decisions which do hold that "danger-
ous probability of success" is an element of attempt to monopo-
116 Id. at 299-301.
117 Id. at 302.
118 Id. at 303-04.
119 Id. at 307. The court of appeals observed that a sales area "is not necessarily the
same as the relevant geographic market for antitrust analysis," noted that the Lebanon and
Wheaton markets were considerably smaller than a circle with a 20-mile radius, and de-
clared that "we have misgivings about the government's method, or lack of method, of
designating Wheaton and Lebanon as relevant geographic markets or submarkets." Id. at
304-05. Nevertheless, that court said it would "accept them for purposes of this appeal."
Id. at 305.
120 Id. at 305.
121 Id. at 307.
122 See note 10 supra.
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lize. 123 The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari.
B. American Airlines
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, United States v. American Airlines,
Inc. ,124 illustrates the judicial struggle with the attempted monopo-
lization offense and the dangerous probability requirement in par-
ticular. The result in American Airlines suggests the manner in which
predatory trade practices may be vulnerable to antitrust challenge.
Whereas Empire Gas challenged repeated efforts by the defendant to
fix prices, American Airlines focused upon a single incident of the
same nature. In that case, the government alleged that the Chief
Executive Officer of American, Robert L. Crandall, "unlawfully at-
tempted to monopolize airline passenger service to a number of
cities served from the Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport by re-
questing that Howard Putnam, Chief Executive Officer of Braniff
Airlines, Inc. . . . , raise Braniff's prices .... while assuring Put-
nam that American would follow suit."' 125
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on
two grounds.' 26 First, it found that the government had failed to
allege the existence of an agreement, an essential element for a
claim of attempted joint monopolization. 27 Second, the court re-
jected the government's allegation that defendant's solicitation
could be reached by the statute governing attempts. 128
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 129
holding that proof of an agreement is not a prerequisite to prove
attempted monopolization,13 0 and that the government had alleged
facts which, if proven, would support a finding of attempted mo-
123 Id.
124 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), rev k 570 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Tex. 1983), cert. dismissed,
106 S. Ct. 420 (1985).
125 570 F. Supp. at 656. The government based its claims on a taped telephone conver-
sation which took place on February 1, 1982. In that conversation, the following exchange
took place:
Crandall: ... I have a suggestion for you. Raise your * * * fares twenty percent.
I'll raise mine the next morning.
Putnam: Robert, we-
Crandall: You'll make more money and I will, too.
Putnam: We can't talk about pricing.
Crandall: Oh, bull * * *, Howard. We can talk about any * * * thing we want to
talk about.
743 F.2d at 1116. Based on this conversation, the government sought an injunction against
American for an alleged violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
126 570 F. Supp. at 663.
127 Id. at 657-59.
128 Id. at 659-63.
129 743 F.2d at 1122.
130 Id. at 1119-20.
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nopolization.' 3' Additionally, the court found that solicitation ac-
companied by a specific intent to monopolize may constitute
attempted monopolization, even where there is no probability of
monopolization because the solicitation was rejected. 132
In addressing the government's section 2 claim, the court of
appeals initially noted that the role of section 2 of the Sherman Act
is "to make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and
perfect by .embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by
[section 1], that is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to monopo-
lize . . . ."33 After finding that if Putnam had accepted Crandall's
offer, the offense of joint monopolization would have been com-
plete,134 the court analyzed the requirements for the attempted mo-
nopolization offense. Relying on the traditional definition by
Justice Holmes in Swift & Co. v. United States, the court identified
two elements of the offense: (1) a specific intent to accomplish the
illegal result, and (2) a dangerous probability that the attempt to
monopolize could be successful.' 3 5 Although previous Fifth Circuit
cases had listed these two elements, those decisions had also re-
quired proof of the relevant market 136 and evidence of overt acts in
furtherance of a scheme to monopolize.' 3 7
The court noted that the government's allegations concerning
131 Id. at 1121-22.
132 Id. at 1120-22. A petition for certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's decision was filed
in the Supreme Court, and was subsequently dismissed. The questions presented for certi-
orari were: "(1) Under § 2 of the Sherman Act, can a single firm, which lacks market power
to monopolize unilaterally, attempt joint monopolization in the absence of agreement with
its competitor?" and "(2) Under § 2 of the Sherman Act, can there be required dangerous
probability of successful joint monopolization where neither competitor, acting alone, has
the capacity to threaten monopolization, and there is no possibility of agreement between
firms?" Petition for Certiorari, No. 85-180, 54 U.S.L.W. 3146 (Sept. 10, 1985), United
States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct.
420 (1985).
133 743 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61
(1911)).
134 743 F.2d at 1118.
135 Id. (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1904)).
136 See, e.g., Transource Int'l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., 725 F.2d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 1984)
("Since section 2 is based on control of the 'relevant market,' our first task is to define that
market for purposes of this case."); Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980,
990 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The offense requires .. .a 'dangerous probability of success' in the
relevant market."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Dimmitt Agri Indus. v. CPC Int'l Inc.,
679 F.2d 516, 525 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Proof of relevant market in attempt cases is required in
connection with the dangerous probability of success element of the attempt offense."), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983); Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d
256, 276 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Because the relevant market provides the framework against
which economic power can be measured, defining the product and geographic markets is a
threshold requirement under § 2."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979).
137 Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 990 (5th Cir. 1983) ("the [at-
tempted monopolization] charge demands evidence of overt acts in furtherance of the
scheme to monopolize"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
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the specific intent element were sufficient.' 38 Furthermore, the
court found that because Crandall and Putnam together had the
capacity to fix prices and because the two airlines allegedly pos-
sessed a substantial combined market share in a market with high
entry barriers, the government had sufficiently alleged a dangerous
probability of success.139
The court's analysis of the dangerous probability of success el-
ement rejected the lower court finding that because there was no
agreement between the parties, and because without joint action
neither party possessed sufficient market power to monopolize the
relevant market, there was no threat of attaining the monopoly
power which would create a section 2 cause of action. In effect, the
district court found the government's allegations insufficient be-
cause without Putnam's agreement, monopolization was a legal im-
possibility. Although not relied upon by the district court, the Fifth
Circuit has previously used legal impossibility to thwart section 2
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims. 140
The court of appeals looked to the criminal law of attempt to
define the dangerous probability element. To find criminal at-
tempt, the court stated, the defendant must have been acting with
the mens rea otherwise required to commit the crime he has at-
tempted, and his conduct must have constituted a substantial step
138 743 F.2d at 1118.
139 Id. at 1118-19.
140 For example, in Transource Int'l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., 725 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1984),
the plaintiff brought an antitrust suit against defendant after a joint venture attempt be-
tween the parties disintegrated. On appeal from a summary judgment for the defendant,
the Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiff's monopolization and attempted monopolization claims
because of defendant's lack of market power in the relevant market. Id. at 284. Relying on
previous Fifth Circuit as well as Supreme Court precedent, the court rejected both claims,
stating that when a defendant has undisputed low market shares, monopolization is impos-
sible as a matter of law. Id.
The district court in American Airlines followed substantially the same reasoning in its
decision, as is illustrated by its conclusion concerning the requirement of an agreement:
Prior to an agreement neither party possesses sufficient market strength to engage
in conduct prohibited by Section 2. It is the agreement, and the consequent threat
of the attainment of monopoly power, that creates a Section 2 cause of action.
Without an agreement or conspiracy, the government's case must fail.
570 F. Supp. at 659 (footnote omitted). For other Fifth Circuit decisions finding that low
market shares make monopoly impossible, see Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant
Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1368 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant not guilty of monopoly as a matter
of law because its share of relevant ornamental plants market was only 20%), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1094 (1977). A.T.&.T. v. Delta Communications Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1106
(S.D. Miss. 1976) (television networks did not monopolize, since they provided less than
50% of the network business), aff'd per curium, 579 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 590 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
The Fifth Circuit cases rely on United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417
(1920) (Court found no monopoly despite a market share of 50% where evidence tended to
show presence of competition in relevant market).
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toward commission of the crime. 141 Comparing the substantial step
element of common law attempt to the dangerous probability of
success element developed in antitrust law, the court found impor-
tant differences. The court stated, "The focus of dangerous
probability of success is upon the likelihood of the prohibited re-
sult, whereas the focus of the substantial step toward commission is
upon a defendant's intent."142 Thus, under the Sherman Act, the
defendant's intent to commit the offense is necessary, but the court
must also inquire as to the likely result if that intent was acted upon,
focusing, in effect, upon the defendant's theoretical capacity to
monopolize.
The Fifth Circuit relied on Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings &
Lewis, Inc. 143 for support. The court stated that since Crandall's al-
leged conduct was "uniquely unequivocal" and its potential
"uniquely consequential," the dangerous probability element was
sufficiently alleged.' 44 Additionally, the court rejected the legal im-
possibility defense dependent on market power: "If a defendant
had the requisite intent and capacity, and his plan if executed would
have had the prohibited market result, it is no defense that the plan
proved to be impossible to execute."' 145
In rejecting the legal impossibility defense, the court specified
that it did not intend to create an "attempted price fixing" offense
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.146 American had argued that
since Crandall's behavior sought to have American and Braniff fix
prices, the offense was actually a section 1 offense, and section 1 did
not reach attempts. The Fifth Circuit stated that under the facts
alleged, Crandall wanted to attain joint monopoly power with Bran-
iff and to engage in price fixing. 147 His inability to fix prices, the
court stated, had no effect on whether he had committed the of-
fense of attempted monopolization through his unsuccessful effort
to monopolize. 148 The Fifth Circuit also concluded, contrary to the
district court's finding, that a solicitation could constitute an at-
tempt, stating, "a highly verbal crime such as attempted monopoli-
zation may be established by proof of a solicitation along with the
requisite intent." 149
The American Airlines decision is flatly inconsistent with Empire
141 743 F.2d at 1119 (citing United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114 (1975)).
142 743 F.2d at 1119.
143 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
144 743 F.2d at 1119.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1122.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1121.
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Gas. In effect, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the elements of attempt
to monopolize in a manner consistent with the third approach iden-
tified above,' 50 where a theoretical capacity to monopolize may be
enough to show a "dangerous probability" of success. The Eighth
Circuit, on the other hand, applied the fourth approach' 5 1 requir-
ing that, in addition to proof that a defendant engaged in conduct
which, if continued or successfully consummated, would lead to
monopolization, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the de-
fendant is dangerously close to achieving monopoly power. In the
context of foreign predation, the difference between the two inter-
pretations is vital, for foreign competitors are unlikely to be found
actually on the brink of monopolization in light of the availability of
predictable protectionists and other intervening political events.
III. Applying Criminal Law Standards to Attempt to Monopolize
American Airlines is a particularly important case because the
court applied criminal law standards for criminal attempt to the
more ambiguous commercial context of attempted monopolization.
As that decision suggests, a "dangerous probability" requirement
may be useful in cases involving practices which may serve legiti-
mate business purposes in some circumstances but may be instru-
ments of monopoly in other circumstances. Such a requirement,
rigorously applied, is not useful if the defendant engages in unilat-
eral conduct which cannot serve any purpose other than restraining
competition. Courts, as in American Airlines, should grant relief
against such conduct without requiring the plaintiff to present elab-
orate economic evidence to demonstrate the actual impact of the
conduct in a precisely defined market.
The dilemma can be resolved by viewing the likelihood or
probability of monopolization as circumstantial evidence of intent.
A showing of probable monopolization is essential to establish in-
tent if the conduct involved is not blatantly anticompetitive. Such a
showing is unnecessary if the conduct demonstrates the intent.
This appears to be the position adopted by the Ninth Circuit.' 52 It
150 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
151 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
152 In Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Go., 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974), the court said:
Nonetheless, appellees in this case argue that dangerous probability must be
shown through evidence of sufficient market power. Certainly market power may
establish dangerous probability. However, Lessig, Industrial Building Materials, and
Moore, supra, hold that dangerous probability may also be shown through proof of
specific intent to set prices or exclude competition in a portion of the market with-
out legitimate business purpose. This specific intent must be accompanied by
predatory conduct directed to accomplishing the unlawful purpose. Ordinarily
specific intent is difficult to prove and will be inferred from such anticompetitive
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is also substantially the position adopted in the Competition Pro-
tection Act of 1979, proposed by the National Commission for the
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. 53
Notwithstanding the result in American Airlines, the Fifth Circuit
reaffirmed and accepted the view that intent alone is not sufficient
to establish an attempt to monopolize. This assumption appears to
be universal in all kinds of attempt cases. The proposition that you
do not send a man to jail for thinking about committing a crime is a
fundamental principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Since sec-
tion 2 is a criminal statute, it necessarily follows that the govern-
ment could not obtain injunctive relief by merely demonstrating
that a single defendant conceived a scheme to monopolize some-
thing. The attempt to monopolize offense necessarily requires
conduct. Therefore, evidence of market power may be relevant, but it is not indis-
pensable where a substantial claim of restraint of trade is made.
Id. at 12.
153 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATrORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 144, 165-66 (1979):
[T]his Act may be cited as the Competition Protection Act of 1979.
Findings.
Sec. 2. Since the passage of the Sherman Act, the courts have not developed a
consistent method for defining an attempt to monopolize. As a result of con-
flicting judicial approaches, the same business conduct may be held lawful in
one jurisdiction and unlawful in another. Anticompetitive conduct has been
held outside antitrust scrutiny by some courts solely on the grounds that such
conduct did not imminently threaten the achievement of a monopoly position
in a specific market. Even where conduct that is clearly and significantly an-
ticompetitive has been involved, courts have frequently required lengthy in-
quiries into present and potential market positions of defendants. It is the
conclusion of the Congress that a proviso to Section 2 of the Sherman Act is
necessary to enable the statute, without deterring procompetitive behavior, to
provide an effective remedy for conduct threatening to create a monopoly or
otherwise to suppress competition.
Revision of Sherman Act Section 2.
Sec. 3. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, shall be deemed guilty of a felony; and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding one million dollars, if a corporation, or if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court. Provided that, in determining whether a person has attempted to mo-
nopolize a part of trade or commerce, (1) a dangerous risk of monopoly shall
be held to exist upon a showing that the conduct alleged to constitute the
attempt significantly threatens competition in any relevant market, as deter-
mined after an evaluation of the defendant's intent, the defendant's present or
probable market power, and the anticompetitive potential of the conduct un-
dertaken; and (2) the fact that a defendant's prices were not below either aver-
age variable cost or marginal cost shall not be controlling, but may properly
be considered, in assessing the defendant's intent and the conduct at issue."
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proof of intent plus something more. The problem the courts face
is to define the nature of the "something more."
That problem is not unique to antitrust cases. Courts have
struggled with the question for decades in the context of other at-
tempt offenses and have never succeeded in developing clear
guidelines. The courts have usually held that the defendant must
go beyond "mere preparation," but that formula is of little or no
assistance in deciding actual cases. No meaningful line exists be-
tween the end of the preparation and the beginning of the
attempt.154
The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code discarded the prepa-
ration-attempt distinction and defined "attempt" to impose liability
upon any person "acting with the kind of culpability otherwise re-
quired for commission of the crime" who "purposely does or omits
to do anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to
be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course
of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the
crime."' 155 The Code also says "[c]onduct shall not be held to con-
stitute a substantial step under subsection (1)(c) of this Section un-
less it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose."' 156
The authors of the draft Code have explained that the "sub-
stantial step" standard was selected because they believe the pur-
pose of the act requirement is to identify persons who are
sufficiently dangerous to warrant prosecution. 5 7 Such a standard
does not differ substantially from the prevailing judicial view of
criminal attempt, although, with special reference to the defenses
of legal or factual impossibility, there remains a conflict in the
holdings. 158
154 See, e.g., United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900 (3d Cir. 1983); Regina v. Eagleton,
169 Eng. Rep. 826 (Crim. App. 1855).
155 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(I)(c) (official draft 1962).
156 Id. § 5.01(2).
157 Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 6, at 584. The authors state: "The innocuous
character of the particular conduct becomes relevant only if the futile endeavor itself indi-
cates a harmless personality, so that immunizing the conduct from liability would not result
in exposing society to a dangerous person." Id.
158 For example, state courts have labeled the following situations as involving legal
impossibility, and concluded that there could be no attempt: (1) A person who accepts
goods which he believes to be stolen, but which are not in fact stolen, is not guilty of at-
tempting to receive stolen goods. People v.Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906); (2) A
person who offers a bribe to one whom he believes to be ajuror, but who was not ajuror, is
not guilty of attempting to bribe a juror. State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 133 S.W.2d 336
(1939); (3) A hunter who shoots a stuffed deer, believing it to be alive, is not guilty of
attempting to shoot a deer out of season. State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1953).
In other similar situations, courts have concluded that the impossibility is factual, and
therefore no defense to a charge of attempt: (1) A person who fires a gun at a bed, thinking
it to be occupied by a man, is guilty of attempted murder, even though the bed is empty.
State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S.W. 175 (1902); (2) A person who possesses a substance
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The "substantial step" test would provide a satisfactory
method for determining when a defendant should be subjected to
liability in an attempt to monopolize case. Prosecuting individuals
or corporations who conceive a monopolization scheme and take
one or more steps to implement the plan is justified if those steps
clearly indicate an unequivocal intent to pursue a particular course
of conduct until the defendant achieves monopoly. Either the gov-
ernment or a private plaintiff should be entitled to obtain injunctive
relief without demonstrating that total monopolization is imminent.
Additionally, a private party who has been injured as a result of the
preliminary steps should be entitled to recover damages when the
conduct lacks any justification whatsoever.
The difficult problem in monopoly cases is to identify the type
of conduct which clearly evidences an intent to monopolize. It is
seldom possible to find direct evidence-such as memoranda or the
testimony of a disgruntled business associate-which demonstrates
an expressed purpose to achieve monopoly. Intent normally must
be inferred from business practices. Many practices which might be
used to achieve monopoly, however, can also be, and normally are,
used for legitimate business purposes. Engaging in below-cost or
so-called "predatory pricing," which is at the heart of current
claims for protectionist legislation in our trade policy, is, without
direct evidence of an exclusionary intent, particularly ambigu-
ous. 159 There is a very real risk that an unduly lax standard of proof
in attempt to monopolize cases could enable private plaintiffs to
use section 2 as a device to inhibit vigorous competition by their
competitors, including foreign competitors.
A "probability of success" requirement is not objectionable if
the courts limit it to cases in which the conduct is ambiguous and a
monopolistic intent cannot be established by direct evidence. How-
ever, there is no sound policy reason for making probable success
an independent element of the offense. A court could achieve the
same result by declaring that the requisite specific intent will not be
inferred from conduct unless the defendant either (1) engages in
conduct which cannot serve any purpose other than restricting
thinking it is narcotics, is guilty of attempted possession, notwithstanding that the sub-
stance is in fact talcum powder. People v. Siu, 126 Cal. App. 2d 41, 271 P.2d 575 (1954);
(3) A person who introduces instruments into a woman for the purpose of producing an
abortion is guilty of attempting an abortion, even though the woman is not pregnant. Peo-
ple v. Cummings, 141 Cal. App. 2d 193, 296 P.2d 610 (1956).
Other impossibility cases are collected in Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 375. See United States v.
Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE 309-40 (6th ed. 1975).
159 See generally Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A
Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976).
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competition, i.e., barring entry or controlling prices, or (2) engages
in conduct which comes very close to producing an actual monop-
oly. The latter would, of course, continue to require proof of rele-
vant market.1 60
In section 2 cases, certain types of conduct, such as communi-
cating threats of economic reprisals to a competitor for the purpose
of inducing him to adhere to a particular price or not to serve par-
ticular customers, should also be viewed as unlawful, without proof
of surrounding market facts. Such an approach is justified as a mat-
ter of economic policy because that conduct can never serve any
purpose which is socially or economically beneficial. It is justified
as a matter of legal theory because the conduct satisfies the intent
and act requirements for an attempt offense. It speaks for itself
with respect to the actor's intent and it is clearly a substantial step
toward the achievement of power to control price. Such conduct
should, therefore, be viewed as an "attempt to monopolize" with-
out any further inquiry into the actual or potential effect of the con-
duct in a particular case. 61
Such a result-oriented approach would be entirely in accord
with the basic objectives of the Sherman Act. The statute was en-
acted in order to prevent conduct which unduly restricts competi-
tion. There is every reason to suppose that Congress was equally
160 As a practical matter, such a formulation of the intent and act requirements would
parallel the per se vs. rule of reason approach which the courts have long followed in § 1
cases. If a bilateral or multilateral agreement falls within one of the traditional per se cate-
gories such as price fixing, division of markets, or boycotts, the* court does not analyze the
actual or potential competitive effects of the agreement. However, if the multilateral activ-
ity involves some kind of restraint of trade which is governed by the "rule of reason,"
courts do examine the business purpose and probable economic effects in order to deter-
mine whether the particular restraint is or is not unreasonable.
161 Such a dual approach to unilateral conduct is essentially the same as the approach
advocated by Professor Turner. See Turner, The Scope of "Attempt to Monopolize," 30 REC.
A.B. Crrv N.Y. 487 (1975). TURNER ADVOCATES A RESULT-ORIENTED APPROACH WHICH
WOULD TAILOR THE PROOF TO THE TYPE OF CONDUCT INVOLVED. IN PARTICULAR, HE STATES:
3. In parallel to a similar proposition regarding the monopolizing offense,
an attempt charge properly lies against plainly invidious conduct, connoting the
presence or likely achievement of some degree of market power, and primarily
responsible for it. Predatory pricing is a good example. Such pricing is itself
proof that the firm, if not already possessing a degree of market power, anticipates
obtaining it-it anticipates that it will be able to recoup the losses by monopoly
profits earned after the target firms are extinguished. There should be no need to
define the market, or in other respects attempt to prove monopoly power, in cor-
rectly defined cases of predatory pricing.
4. An attempt charge is also properly directed against a course of conduct
other than competition on the merits which, if continued or successfully consummated,
would probably produce the degree of market power that would constitute mo-
nopoly for purposes of the monopolizing offense (i.e., a substantial degree of mar-
ket power). This is similar to the "dangerous probability" test in the traditional
formulation of the attempt offense.
Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
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concerned with unilateral and multilateral conduct. Indeed, there
are good reasons for concluding that the proof requirements in at-
tempt to monopolize cases should be less stringent than the proof
requirements in other types of attempt cases. In conventional crim-
inal cases, harm usually does not result unless the offense is com-
pleted. An attempt to achieve monopoly can have an adverse effect
upon competition even if the actor never succeeds in acquiring suf-
ficient market power to achieve monopoly. Congress may well have
been cognizant of this when it chose to prohibit both monopoliza-
tion and attempts to monopolize. 162
IV. Conclusion
The 1978-79 National Commission for the Review of Antitrust
Laws and Procedures, as a substantial part of its work, recom-
mended that the attempt to monopolize provision of the Sherman
Act be legislatively modified and defined. The Solicitor General, in
a brief submitted to the Supreme Court in 1977 in support of certi-
orari in Empire Gas, advocated that the Court adopt the same rule.
Case law in the lower courts is in disarray, although most
courts, notwithstanding American Airlines, now hold that a defendant
is not guilty of attempted monopolization unless it is already dan-
gerously close to controlling an entire market, regardless of the
plainly predatory nature of the defendant's conduct and its clearly
defined monopolistic goal. The Supreme Court has not decided an
attempt to monopolize case since 1951, when it held in LorainJour-
nal that an Ohio newspaper had violated the attempt clause of sec-
tion 2 by coercing local advertisers not to do business with a new
radio station operating in the same area.
As an alternative to a new wave of protectionist legislation, our
domestic business interests should be encouraged, through a clari-
fication of the elements of the attempt to monopolize offense, to
privately invoke this longstanding weapon against forms of eco-
nomic imperialism. They will have a realistic chance of success, and
162 ChiefJustice White's description of the history and purpose of the Sherman Act and
the relationship between the first and second sections supports the view that the statute is
not limited to preventing monopoly. His opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1910), noted that the terms "monopoly," "engrossing," and "restraint of trade"
originally had distinct meanings, but that these distinctions had become blurred by the time
the Sherman Act was enacted. He concluded that the authors of the Act used those terms
in the popular sense and deduced that the purpose of § 2 is
to make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by embrac-
ing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section, that is, restraints of
trade, by any attempt to monopolize, or monopolization thereof, even although
acts by which such results are attempted to be brought about or are brought about
be not embraced within the general enumeration of the first section.
Id. at 61.
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a real deterrent will be created. Such a private treble-damage
threat would not directly implicate American foreign policy but
would allow our free enterprise system to defend itself in our
courts. On the other hand, the complaints of foreign predation
would be subjected to rigorous factfinding to determine their valid-
ity. The reinforcement of private treble-damage plaintiffs as private
attorneys general has long been central to the preservation of our
market economy.16 3
For too long our Commerce Department and its interests have
been allowed to contend without criticism that our antitrust laws
are only an impediment to foreign trade. Such an argument re-
cently produced legislative results whose wisdom is yet to be
tested. 164 It should be at least equally clear, however, that our anti-
trust laws, particularly the attempt to monopolize provision, if clari-
fied as suggested both in this article and by others, can be used
affirmatively as a private weapon to promote international trade
and eliminate monopolistic impediments to a free market. Legisla-
tive or Supreme Court clarification of section 2 would be a timely
alternative to protectionism.
163 The coordination of antitrust and foreign commerce policies is supported by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982)), which, of course, was generally designed to allow our
private commercial interests better access to our courts to redress grievances against the
commercial arms of foreign governments. An amended, -the § 2 attempt clause would
dovetail nicely with the FSIA.
164 See, e.g., Export Trading Company Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982)); National Cooperative Re-
search Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305
(Supp. I 1984)).
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